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as numerical examples demonstrate that more seats are protected for higher-fare passengers under
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Revenue Management Games:
Horizontal and Vertical Competition

Abstract: A well-studied problem in the literature on airline revenue (or yield) management is the
optimal allocation of seat inventory among fare classes given a demand distribution for each
class. In practice, the seat allocation decisions of one airline affect the passenger demands for
seats on other airlines. In this paper we examine the seat inventory control problem under both
horizontal competition (two airlines compete for passengers on the same flight leg) and vertical
competition (different airlines fly different legs on a multi-leg itinerary). Such vertical
competition can be the outcome of a code sharing agreement between airlines, for each airline
sells seats on the partner airlines’ flights but the airlines are unwilling, or unable, to coordinate
yield management decisions. We provide a quite general sufficient condition under which a
pure-strategy Nash equilibrium exists in these 'revenue management games', and we also
compare the total number of seats available in each fare class with, and without, competition.
Analytical results as well as numerical examples demonstrate that under horizontal competition
more seats are protected for higher-fare passengers than when a single airline acts as a
monopoly, while under vertical competition the booking limit may be higher, or lower, than the
monopoly level, depending upon the demand for connecting flights in each fare class. Finally,
we discuss revenue-sharing contracts that coordinate the actions of both airlines.
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1. Introduction
Consider an airline customer looking for an early-morning flight from Rochester, NY to Chicago in May
2003. The traveler can choose between two airlines, American and United, who offer flights at nearly
identical times (6:00 am and 6:10 am, respectively) at identical prices (both charge $266 for 14-day and
$315 for 7-day advance purchase round-trip tickets). Now suppose that our customer wishes to purchase
American’s 14-day advance ticket. If the seats allocated to the 14-day fare class have sold out, it is likely
that the customer will attempt to purchase a ticket in the same fare class on the United flight that departs
10 minutes later. In general, the allocation of seat inventory among fare classes by one airline affects the
quantity of customer demand, and optimal seat allocation, of the other airline. If the airlines are
competitors and do not collaborate on seat allocation decisions, then the decisions that arise out of the
resulting game can differ significantly from the seat allocations that would be optimal for a single
decision-maker with control over both airlines.
Here we use the term ‘horizontal competition’ when describing airlines that compete for
customers on a single flight-leg. We will use the term ‘vertical competition’ to refer to different airlines
that fly different legs on a multi-leg itinerary. For example, a traveler who wishes to fly from Cleveland
to Tokyo can purchase a convenient two-leg itinerary with the first leg operated by Continental Airlines
from Cleveland to Los Angeles, and the second leg operated by Northwest Airlines from Los Angeles to
Tokyo. (We call this customer a ‘connecting passenger.’) Because these two airlines have formed an
alliance that allows each airline to sell tickets for flights operated by the alliance partner (an arrangement
called code sharing), the Cleveland-Los Angeles-Tokyo ticket can be purchased from either airline. In
this case, the term ‘vertical competition’ may seem to be a misnomer, for airlines in such an alliance
cooperate by code sharing. However, technical and legal barriers often prevent the airlines from
explicitly coordinating both pricing and seat inventory decisions.1 As was true for horizontal competition,
the seat inventory decisions of one airline affect customer demand and inventory decisions of the other,
and the absence of perfect coordination can lead to inventory allocation decisions that differ significantly
from the system-optimal solution.
In this paper we examine how both horizontal and vertical competition affect airline seat inventory
decisions, and we consider how airlines in an alliance may coordinate these decisions by agreements

1

Boyd (1998a) describes how coordinating the revenue management systems of multiple airlines can be a “logistical
nightmare”, and he explains that an airline may believe that its own proprietary system provides a competitive advantage and
therefore the airline may resist merging systems with an ally. In addition, many alliances are not immunized from anti-trust
regulations, and airline revenue managers for these airlines are concerned that the Federal Government may see overt
coordination of seat inventory decisions as a violation of antitrust law (Zuckerman, 2002).
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similar to revenue-sharing contracts. There is evidence that over the past ten years alliances have become
more numerous and increasingly important for the airline industry. The U.S. airlines have recently
formed the two largest alliances in history (United Airlines and US Airways in 2002, and Delta Airlines
joined Northwest and Continental in 2003). The first major international alliances were formed in the
early and mid-1990’s, and international passenger traffic between hubs of code-sharing partners increased
by 43% between 1992 and 1997, while international traffic between other hubs increased by just 7% (U.
S. Department of Transportation, 2000). There are many advantages to such alliances. They allow
airlines to expand into new markets and to increase the frequency of flights offered within markets served
by both airlines. If given antitrust immunity, alliance partners can increase profits by coordinating
activities such as marketing, purchasing, luggage handling and flight scheduling. These partners may also
apply revenue management techniques to optimize joint revenues (for a thorough summary of the benefits
and costs of airline alliances, see Fernandez de la Torre, 1999). However, as we mentioned above, there
can be significant barriers to such coordination, and the airlines struggle to find decentralized mechanisms
to integrate revenue management decisions.
There is a substantial economics literature analyzing airline behavior under competition and the
impact of airline alliances. There is also a recent stream of operations research literature on the problem
of optimal seat allocation. However, to our knowledge there are no published papers that place the seat
allocation problem in a competitive framework, examine the impact of airline alliances on these decisions,
or specify contracts that enable airlines to coordinate decisions. We address these issues here, for an
understanding of how competition affects revenue management decisions would be helpful for airline
managers who negotiate contracts with potential alliance partners or design systems to implement
alliances, as well as for government regulators who must evaluate the impact of airline alliances.
After a review of the literature in Section 2, in Section 3 we describe the traditional single-airline,
single-leg, two-class yield management problem, and we introduce a condition on the demand distribution
that will be useful in later sections. We discuss horizontal competition in Section 4. In this case, each
airline is faced with an initial demand from passengers who wish to purchase tickets, but each airline may
also sell tickets to passengers that were denied a reservation on the competing airline. In Section 5 we
consider vertical competition: each airline has both local and connecting demand, but the number of
connecting passengers booked on one airline is limited by the number booked by an alliance partner. In
both cases the optimal capacity limits for each class (the booking limits) on each airline are
interdependent. We compare the revenue management policies of competing airlines with the policy of a
monopolist who operates all flights or, equivalently, the policies of airlines that cooperate to maximize
total profits. Analytical results for special cases as well as numerical examples demonstrate that under
2

horizontal competition more seats are protected for higher-fare passengers than when a single airline acts
as a monopoly, while under vertical competition the booking limit may be higher, or lower, than the
monopoly level, depending upon the quantity of connecting demand in each fare class. In Section 6 we
present revenue-sharing contracts that coordinate the actions of both airlines, and in Section 7 we discuss
managerial insights and consider directions for further work.

2. Related Literature
Publications that consider the interactions among economic forces, strategic airline market entry
decisions, and airline schedules include the network design models of Lederer and Nambimamdom
(1999), Dobson and Lederer (1994), and the empirical work by Borenstein and Rose (1994). Another
body of research focuses on the airlines' scheduling decisions under competition using variants of the
spatial model developed by Hotelling (1929). See, for example, the recent empirical papers by Borenstein
and Netz (1999) and Richard (2003). These papers focus on broad competitive problems and ignore the
specifics of seat inventory allocation. In this paper we will not be concerned with the reasons airlines
schedule their flights at the same time or with the pricing decision for each flight. Rather, we will
concentrate on the implications of competitive scheduling on seat inventory control.
There are numerous papers in the area of revenue management that focus on airline yield
management. For fundamental results on the general subject of seat inventory control see Belobaba
(1989), Brumelle et al. (1990), and a useful literature review by McGill and van Ryzin (1999). Some of
our results for horizontal competition are related to the unpublished work by Li and Oum (1998), which
describes a seat allocation problem for two airlines in competition but uses a relatively restrictive
assumption about how demand is allocated among airlines and identifies one, symmetric equilibrium.
Zhao and Atkins (2002) describe a model with two airlines competing for passengers in one demand
class. Belobaba and Wilson (1997) describe a simulation model that is used to evaluate the benefits of
yield management systems for airlines under competition.
The literature on inventory management has seen a stream of closely related papers devoted to
competition among firms in which the firms determine inventory levels and customers may switch among
firms until a suitable product is found. This has been described as a 'newsvendor game' or as ‘inventory
competition’ and is related to our concept of horizontal competition. Parlar (1988) examines the
competition between two retailers facing independent demands. Lippman and McCardle (1997) examine
both the two-firm game and a game with an arbitrary number of players. In their models, initial industry
demand is allocated among the players according to a pre-specified 'splitting rule.' They establish the
existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and show that the equilibrium is unique when the initial
3

allocation is deterministic and strictly increasing in the total industry demand for each player. Recent
extensions of these models include Mahajan and van Ryzin (1999) who model demand as a stochastic
sequence of utility-maximizing customers. For an arbitrary number of firms, they demonstrate that an
equilibrium exists and show that it is unique for a symmetric game. Netessine and Rudi (2003) analyze a
problem similar to Parlar (1988) but for an arbitrary number of products. Given mild parametric
assumptions they establish the existence of, and characterize, a unique, globally stable Nash equilibrium.
Many of these papers compare total inventory levels under competition with inventory levels
when firms cooperate. Lippman and McCardle (1997) show that competition can lead to higher
inventories, and Mahajan and van Ryzin (1999) derive similar results given their dynamic model of
customer purchasing. On the other hand, with the substitution structure of the model of Netessine and
Rudi (2003), under competition some firms may stock less than under centralization. It is not
immediately clear how these results can be extended to our model of horizontal competition, for the
problem described here involves the allocation of a fixed inventory between two customer classes.
Therefore, ‘overstocking’ of inventory in one class would imply ‘understocking’ in the other class. We
will also see that in our problem, an airline’s demand depends upon its own booking-limit decision, a
complication not seen in any newsvendor game.
In addition, our demand model for each fare class is more general than those that have been used
in the literature. Lippman and McCardle’s stylized splitting rules generate demands that are either
independent or perfectly correlated, while Parlar only considers independent demands. In our model,
customer demand may follow an arbitrary distribution. Besides being a more natural description of realworld demand, allowing a general demand distribution leads to additional insights. For example, the
traditional newsvendor game always has a pure strategy equilibrium, but ours may not. We will see that
the correlation structure of demand between products has an important impact on the dynamics of the
game, and our model allows us to find general conditions under which the game has an equilibrium.
Analysis of vertical competition dates back to Spengler (1950) who demonstrated in a simple
supply chain that the effect of double-marginalization leads to suboptimal system performance. Since
then there have been numerous studies of vertical competition in the supply chain setting but, to the best
of our knowledge, no analysis in the revenue management setting. While there is both theoretical and
empirical research investigating the impact of code sharing agreements on ticket prices (see, for example,
Brueckner and Whalen 2000, and Brueckner 2003), to the best of our knowledge there is no published
work investigating the inefficiencies that arise during day-to-day yield management decisions.
The specific terms of code sharing agreements are usually not available to public. However,
4

Wynne (1995) and Boyd (1998a) describe some of the coordination mechanisms that are used in practice.
Besides short accounts in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) and Boyd (1998b), there has been no published
analytical analysis of contracts among airline alliance partners. In general, there is much confusion, and
very little theoretical support, for alliance partners when they attempt to design contracts. The contracts
we propose are related to work of Cachon and Lariviere (2000) on revenue sharing in supply chain
management. See also Cachon (2004) for the survey of contracting literature in operations management.

3. The Single-Airline, Single-Leg Problem
Before discussing the effects of competition on yield management practices, we review the traditional
stand-alone yield management problem, introduce some notation, and derive a result that will be used
throughout the paper. Let pk be the net revenue from a passenger in class k=L,H (low-fare and high-fare),
which takes into account the variable cost of flying that passenger. Demand for tickets at these prices is
represented by the random variables Dk, k  L, H . A ticket purchased for either fare provides access to
the same product: a coach-class seat on one flight leg. We assume that demand for low-fare tickets occurs
before demand for high-fare tickets, which is the case when advance-purchase requirements are used to
distinguish between customers with different valuations on price and flexibility. Customers who prefer a
low fare and are willing to accept the purchase restrictions will be called 'low-fare customers'. Customers
who prefer to purchase later, at the higher price, are called 'high-fare customers'. We assume that there
are no customer cancellations.
To maximize expected profits, the airline establishes a booking limit B for low-fare seats. Note
that the establishment of a booking limit is an optimal policy for each airline – see Brumelle et al. (1990).
Once the booking limit is reached, the low fare is closed. Sales of high-fare tickets are accepted until
either the airplane is full or the flight departs.
This model contains only two fare classes, when in reality there may be many more (see Belobaba
1998 for an introduction to the complexities of real-world yield management systems). We also assume
that the airlines' booking limits are static. That is, the booking limit is set before demand is realized and
no adjustments are made as low-fare demand is observed. This model simplifies other aspects of the
actual environment. For example, we assume that a passenger denied a low-fare booking does not attempt
to upgrade to the high-fare class and that a passenger, when first denied a ticket, will not shift to a later or
earlier flight operated by the same airline. These assumptions appear often in the literature on noncompetitive revenue management, and, given the added complexity of our problem involving
competition, we adopt them here as well.
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Given that the aircraft has capacity C, the airline’s optimization problem is
max B   E  pL min  DL , B   pH min  DH , C  min  DL , B    .

(3.1)

The first-order condition is,

 pL Pr  DL  B   pH min  DH  C  B, DL  B 
B
 Pr  DL  B   pL  pH min  DH  C  B | DL  B    0.

(3.2)

If DL , DH are independent, it is easy to see that there is a unique solution. To address dependent
demands, Brumelle et al. (1990) introduced the “monotonic association property.” Given that
Pr  DH  C  B | DL  B  is monotonically increasing in B (‘monotonic association’), there is a unique

solution to (3.2). Here we introduce a related property, that DL and DH are ‘totally positive of order 2’
(TP2). TP2 implies that realizations of the random variables are more likely to be high together, or low
together, than to be mixed ‘high’ and ‘low’ (see Joe 1997 for a thorough discussion of TP2 and its
properties).
Proposition 1. Suppose DL , DH are TP2 (Totally Positive of Order 2). Then there is a unique solution to
the optimality condition (3.2) and the objective function (3.1) is quasi-concave.
Proof: From Proposition 2.3 of Joe (1997), TP2 implies that DL and DH are right-tail increasing, i.e.,
Pr( DH  C  B | DL  B ) is increasing in B. The result follows. 
In the proof, the sufficient condition on DL , DH is actually weaker than the TP2 condition: the two
random variables must be ‘right-tail increasing’ (RTI), a property similar to (but stronger than) monotonic
association. However, working with the TP2 property is convenient, for we know that there are many
useful bivariate distributions that are TP2. These include any set of independent random variables, the
multivariate logistic, Gamma and F distributions, and the bivariate normal distribution with positive
correlation (Karlin and Rinott, 1980, and Tong, 1990). The TP2 property can also be extended to the
multivariate TP2 property (MTP2). Both TP2 and MTP2 will be useful in the next two sections.
4. Horizontal Competition
Suppose two airlines offer direct flights between the same origin and destination, with departures and
arrivals at similar times. We use subscripts i,j=1,2 to distinguish two competing airlines. Flights have the
seat capacity Ci and there are two fare classes available for passengers: 'low-fare' and 'high-fare.' If either
type of customer is denied a ticket at one airline, the

customer will attempt to purchase a ticket from the
6

other airline and we call these “overflow passengers” (see Figure 1). Therefore, both airlines are faced
with a random initial demand for each fare class as well as demand from customers who are denied tickets
by the other airline. Passengers denied reservations by both airlines are lost. Figure 1 shows the overflow
processes. We assume that both airlines’ prices satisfy pLi  pHi . We also assume that the random
variables Dki have nonnegative support and that the cumulative distributions are differentiable.
Airline 1
C1
High fare
class

DH1

Airline 2
high-fare overflow from 1 to 2
high-fare overflow from 2 to 1

C2
High fare
class

DH2

B1
B2

DL1

Low fare
class

low-fare overflow from 1 to 2

Low fare
class

low-fare overflow from 2 to 1

DL2

Figure 1: Horizontal Competition

Note that all results presented in this section also apply to a model in which some fraction (less
than one) of passengers denied a ticket on one airline attempt to purchase a ticket from the other airline,
while some fraction (greater than zero) are lost to both airlines. To simplify the model and minimize the
number of parameters, we assume that all passengers denied a ticket from their first choice overflow to
their second-choice airline.
The model describes two airlines engaging in a non-cooperative game with complete information.
Each airline attempts to maximize its profits by adjusting its booking levels. In other words, the booking
level Bi  [0,Ci] is the strategy space of airline i (for simplicity, we assume that the booking level may be
any real number in this range). Each airline knows the strategy spaces and demand distributions of its
own flight as well as those of the competing airline. Throughout the paper we will use Bic to denote
equilibrium booking limits set by competing airlines, and we will be comparing these with Bia , the
optimal booking limits established by an alliance of two airlines that coordinate yield management
decisions (or, a profit-maximizing monopoly).
An important assumption of the model is that the initial demands Dki are exogenous; they are not
affected by the booking limits chosen by each airline. This assumption is consistent with the newsvendor
games of Parlar (1988) and Lippman and McCardle (1997). However, one might argue that the booking
limits determine seat availability, and that in the long run this aspect of service quality affects initial
demand. A more complete model would incorporate this relationship between booking limits and
7

demand, and the solution would supply equilibrium demands as well as equilibrium booking limits. For
our application, however, the relationship between booking limits and demand is weakened by marketing
efforts such as advertising and frequent-flyer programs. In addition, the use of travel agents and on-line
reservation tools reduces the marginal search cost associated with making each booking. Given low
search costs, the decision as to which airline to query first may depend on factors that dominate the
likelihood that the query will result in a booking.
The order of events in the game is consistent with the traditional yield management problem:
1. Airlines establish booking limits B1 and B2.
2. Low-fare passengers arrive to their first-choice airlines and are accommodated up to the booking
limits. Low-fare passengers not accommodated on their first-choice airlines 'spill' to the alternate
airlines and are accommodated up to the booking limits.
3. High-fare passengers arrive to their first-choice airlines and are accommodated with any remaining
seats, up to capacity Ci in each aircraft. High-fare passengers not accommodated on their first-choice
airlines 'spill' to the alternate airlines and are accommodated in any remaining seats, up to capacity Ci
in each aircraft.
Note that for an airline to enforce a booking-limit policy it is not necessary to distinguish between
‘original’ and ‘overflow’ passengers. Once demand is realized, each airline simply observes the arrival of
low-fare passengers and then the arrival of high-fare passengers. Each group of customers contains a
mixture of first-choice and overflow passengers.
To describe the problem in terms of customer demand and booking limits, define:
DLiT  DLi  ( DLj  B j )  , total demand for low-fare tickets on airline i, i=1, j=2 and i=2, j=1.

Ri  Ci  min( DLiT , Bi ) , the number of seats available for high-fare passengers on airline i = 1,2.
T
DHi
 DHi  ( DHj  R j )  , total demand for high-fare tickets, i=1, j=2 and i=2, j=1.

The total revenue for airline i is
T
 i  E  pLi min( DLiT , Bi )  pHi min( DHi
, Ri )  .

(4.1)

Each airline will maximize this expression, given the booking limit of its competitor. It will be instructive
to examine the first derivative of this objective function. It is tedious to find the derivative by the
traditional methods (e.g., applying Leibnitz's rule). Instead, by applying the techniques described in Rudi
(2000), we find for i=1, j=2 and i=2, j=1,
8

 i
T
 pLi Pr( DLiT  Bi )  pHi Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bi , DLiT  Bi )
Bi

(4.2)

 pHi Pr( DLi  Bi , D  B j , DHj  R j , D  Ci  Bi ).
T
Lj

T
Hi

Although this is a complex expression, there is a straightforward interpretation for each term. An
incremental increase in the booking limit Bi by airline i has three effects on that airline's total revenue.
First, revenue from low-fare customers increases with probability Pr( DLiT  Bi ) . Second, revenue from
T
 Ci  Bi , DLiT  Bi ) . While these two effects
the high-fare customers decreases with probability Pr( DHi

are direct consequences of the change in Bi, there is a third, indirect effect. Revenue from high-fare
customers may decrease due to the following sequence of events: (i) an increase is Bi may reduce the
overflow of low-fare customers from i to j, (ii) a reduction in the number of low-fare customers at j may
increase the number of seats available for high-fare customers at j, (iii) this may reduce the overflow of
high-fare customers from j to i and (iv) a decline in the overflow from j may reduce the number of highfare customers accommodated at i. The probability of this sequence of events is the third term on the
right-hand side of equation (4.2), which implies that an increase in the booking limit of airline i can result
in a decrease in high-fare demand to airline i. Hence, even though there is no explicit dependence
between airline’s booking limit and its demand, such dependence is introduced through the game.
Because the strategy spaces of the airlines are compact and the payoff functions are continuous, a Nash
equilibrium in mixed strategies must exist. However, a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium may or may not
exist for airlines playing this game.
4.1 Nash Equilibrium Conditions
T
In the following proposition we show that if DLi and DHi
are TP2 then the game has a pure strategy Nash

equilibrium. In a corollary we show that these conditions also hold if D  DL1 , DL 2 , DH 1 , DH 2  is MTP2.
This result indicates that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium depends upon the correlation of
demands among fare classes within each airline, and does not directly depend upon the demand
correlation between airlines (later we will describe a numerical example that compares these two cases).
This result helps to distinguish our analysis from the analysis of Parlar (1988) and of Lippman and
McCardle (1997). In the classic ‘newsvendor game’ there is only one type of demand faced by each firm,
a Nash equilibrium always exists and increase in inventory by one firm leads to a decrease in inventory by
the competitors (a game of substitutes). In our model, the addition of another demand class competing for
the same resource not only complicates the analysis but also raises the possibility that there will not be a
joint pure strategy at all, and/or that an increase in the booking limit of one airline may lead to an increase
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in the booking limit of the other airline. However, we show that under many reasonable demand
distributions, such counterintuitive behavior does not appear.
T
Proposition 2. Suppose that DLi and DHi
, i=1,2, are TP2. Then a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.

In addition, the best response functions are decreasing (possibly with jumps down): if one player
increases the booking limit, it is optimal for the other player to decrease the booking limit.
Proof: See the Appendix.

It is worth noting that the proof of Proposition 2 does not rely on showing that the game is submodular
(this has been shown for newsvendor games, see Lippman and McCardle 1997), for the game under
horizontal competition is not submodular. Instead, we utilize Tarsky’s fixed point theorem and explore
the structural properties of the best response functions. Note also that proposition 2 specifies conditions
T
T
on DLi and DHi
, although realizations of DHi
may depend upon all four demand realizations. The

following Corollary describes appropriate conditions on these underlying demand distributions.
Corollary 1. If DL1 , DL 2 , DH 1 , DH 2  are multivariate TP2 (MTP2) in their density functions, then the

results of Proposition 2 also hold.
Proof: From Theorem 2.2 in Joe (1997), if D  DL1 , DL 2 , DH 1 , DH 2  are MTP2, then so are

 f1 D , f 2 D , f 3 D , f 4 D  where fi are increasing functions.
DL1 , DL 2 , DH 1 , DH 2  ,

T
Because DHi
is an increasing function of

T
DLi and DHi
are TP2 as well. The results of Proposition 2 follow. 

As we mentioned in Section 3, there are many useful distributions that satisfy the MTP2 property.
Multivariate normal distributions of three or more random variables are MTP2 if the inverse of the
covariance matrix satisfies certain properties (specifically, it must be an ‘M-matrix’, see Karlin and
Rinott, 1980). On the other hand, if a multivariate normal distribution is MTP2, then a necessary
condition is that its correlation coefficients are non-negative. When the demand distributions for high and
T
are not TP2, and
low-fare passengers ( DLi and DHi ) are strongly negatively correlated, then DLi and DHi

the Proposition 2 suggests that we may not see a well-behaved game. However, when demand
T
distributions between airlines (e.g., DLi and DLj ) are negatively associated, DLi and DHi
may still satisfy

the TP2 condition. In that case, even though D is not TP2, Proposition 2 may still hold.
Figures 2 and 3, for example, show the best response functions ri ( Bi ) of two airlines with Ci= Cj
=200 and demands that are characterized by large, negative correlation. To generate Figure 2, we created
a demand distribution with a correlation of -0.9 between high and low-fare demands within each airline,
10

but with independent demands between airlines.2 For Figure 3, high and low-fare demands are
independent, but the between-airline correlation is -0.9. As suggested by the Proposition 2, the results are
very different. Figure 2 shows a game without any pure-strategy equilibrium, and contains a ‘jump’ in
which a rise in the booking limit of one airline leads to a sharp rise in the booking limit of the other
airline. The game in Figure 3, on the other hand, is well-behaved, with a single equilibrium at a booking
limit of 50 seats. In the general horizontal competitive game described above, it is also possible to have
more than one equilibrium.
200

200

r2(B1)
150

150

r1(B2)

r1(B2)
B2 100

B2 100

50

50

0

0

50

100

150

0

200

0

r2(B1)
50

100

150

200

B1

B1

Figure 2: Best response functions with

Figure 3: Best response functions with

cor ( DLi , DHi )  cor ( DLj , DHj )  0.9 ,

cor ( DLi , DHi )  cor ( DLj , DHj )  0 ,

cor ( DLi , DLj )  cor ( DHi , DHj )  0

cor ( DLi , DLj )  cor ( DHi , DHj )  0.9

4.2 Comparing the Competitors and a Monopolist We will now compare the behavior of two airlines in

competition with the behavior of a monopolist. Note that the term 'monopolist' does not necessarily imply
that a single firm is the only airline on a particular route. The 'monopolist' may be two airlines in an
alliance to coordinate yield management decisions. In addition, two airlines may compete on a particular
route at certain times of day, while each airline may hold a virtual monopoly at other times of day because
its competitor has not scheduled a competing flight at a point close in time.
In general, we will find that under horizontal competition the total booking limit for the
monopolist is never less than the sum of the booking limits of two competing airlines. To help us
understand the dynamics of the game, we first examine a simplified model with high-fare passenger
overflow only, and then we discuss numerical experiments with the full model. To enable proper

2

Intuitively, jumps in the best responses occur because, under negative correlation, each airline faces two entirely opposite
states of the world: (i) heavy low-fare demand and no high-fare demand and (ii) heavy high-fare demand and no low-fare
demand. Therefore, each airline establishes either a large booking limit, essentially betting on the first state of the world, or it
can establish a low booking limit while hoping for the second state. Under certain problem parameters the two decisions
produce the same expected profit so that the objective function is bimodal and the best response is to jump from one mode to
the other when the competitor’s decision changes (see Appendix, Figure 5). However, such an extreme negative correlation is
unlikely to occur in practice. Demand forecast errors for different fare classes are more likely to be independent or weakly
positively correlated (see Section 4.3). Therefore, the outcome in Figure 3 is more plausible.
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comparison, we assume that the prices pki and the distribution of consumer demands Dki are equal under
the competitive and monopoly environments.
Consider the situation when low-fare customers do not overflow to a second-choice flight while
high-fare passengers do overflow. This applies in the (unlikely) case that low-fare customers are willing
to fly on only one airline. A similar, even simpler model applies to the case where low-fare demand is
sufficiently large so that the booking limits of both airlines are always reached (e.g., it is high enough to
fill an entire aircraft) and therefore low-fare overflow is irrelevant. With no low-fare overflow, objective
function (4.1) is replaced by
T
 i  E  pLi min( DLi , Bi )  pHi min( DHi
, Ri )  ,

(4.3)

and the optimality condition  i / Bi  0 at Bic can be written as,
T
Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bic | DLi  Bic ) 

pLi
.
pHi

(4.4)

It can be shown that there is a unique equilibrium in this game (see Netessine and Shumsky, 2004,
Proposition S1 for details). In the following proposition we will compare booking limits under
competition with system-optimal booking limits. Note that in this proposition and in all subsequent
propositions we assume that the optimal solutions for the monopolist and the equilibrium under
competition are in the interior, i.e., Bia , Bic  (0, Ci ).
Proposition 3. Assume that each airline maximizes objective function (4.3), so that there is no low-fare
T
and DLi are TP2. Then the booking limits are lower under competition than the
overflow, and that DHi

centralized solution: Bic  Bia and B cj  B aj .
Proof: The objective function of the alliance is the sum of the two airlines’ objective functions,

   i   j , and the centralized optimality condition  ( i   j ) / Bi  0 can be written as,
T
Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bia | DLi  Bia ) 

pLi  j

pHi Bi



Bia , B aj



1
.
pHi Pr( DLi  Bia )

(4.5)

Clearly,  j / Bi  0 because an increase in the booking limit by one airline results in more high-fare
passengers for the other airline without any effect on demand by low-fare passengers. By comparing (4.4)
and (4.5) we find,
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T
T
 Ci  Bic | DLi  Bic )  Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bia | DLi  Bia ) .
Pr( DHi

(4.6)

Now consider the following four cases:
1. Bic  Bia , B cj  B aj . Given the TP2 assumption, the probability term in (4.6) is increasing in both Bi and
B j , so this case is impossible.
2. Bic  Bia , B cj  B aj . Consider the change from Bic to Bia . A decrease in Bi leads to a decrease in the
probability term while an increase in B j leads to an increase in the probability term. For inequality (4.6)
to hold, the second effect must dominate. But for this to happen we need Bi  B j where  refers to
an absolute change in the booking limit. However, analysis of the second optimality condition  j / B j
leads to the opposite requirement Bi  B j which is a contradiction.
3. Bic  Bia , B cj  B aj . This leads to another contradiction, by the same reasoning as the previous case.
The only remaining option is that Bic  Bia and B cj  B aj . 
Proposition 3 implies that, under competition, at least as many seats are held for high-fare customers as is
optimal under joint profit maximization. For the monopolist, every high-fare passenger who does not find
a seat at airline i and turns to airline j is not 'lost' to the firm. Under competition, however, when airline i
establishes a lower booking limit, airline j lowers its booking limit as well as the two airlines compete for
high-fare passengers.
A similar proof demonstrates that when there is only low-fare overflow, and no high-fare
overflow, then Bic  Bia and B cj  B aj . We do not believe that this result has practical significance, for it is
difficult to imagine a situation in which high-fare customers do not overflow (e.g., if there are few highfare customers, then the booking limit is adjusted accordingly so the overflow is likely to occur).
However, this result, when combined with Proposition 3, shows that the outcome of the full game
described in Section 4.1 is not clear, for the full game has both types of overflow.
4.3 Numerical analysis To determine whether the previous section's results apply to the full-fledged

game, we calculate numerically both the competitive equilibrium and the optimal monopoly solution in a
game with both low-fare and high-fare overflow. We perform these numerical experiments over a range
of parameter values that is sufficiently wide so that we replicate most possible real-world scenarios. Our
goal is to see whether the booking limit set by the monopoly, B1a  B2a , is consistently greater than or
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equal to the total booking limit under competition, B1c  B2c .
To find the appropriate range of parameters we examined a variety of sources, including published
papers, unpublished PhD theses, and databases collected by the airline industry and the U.S. Department
of Transportation (DOT). Our most significant primary source is the DOT’s quarterly ‘Passenger Origin
and Destination Survey’ (DOT, 2004). This database, known as either ‘Data Base 1a’ or ‘the O&D
Survey,’ contains a 10% sample of all airline tickets sold for flights originating during a 3-month period.
Each record of each ticket includes the cities visited by the passenger (the itinerary), the price of the
ticket, and a fare code indicating whether the ticket was restricted or unrestricted. In general, unrestricted,
or full-fare, tickets are not subject to limitations such as advance purchase requirements,
minimum/maximum stays, or refund penalties. To estimate parameters of our model that are related to
fare classes, such as the ratio p H / p L , we used the database’s fare code as a proxy for our high and lowfare categories. Given that our model allows for only two types of fare classes, we believe that dividing
fares into restricted and unrestricted categories is a reasonable approximation.
In total, the O&D Survey provided us with information on 471,000 tickets sold in 1500 different
markets (origin/destination pairs). The following list summarizes the data analysis and the parameter
values. For more details on the O&D Survey, our analysis of these data, and the following numerical
experiments, see Netessine and Shumsky (2004).
-

Capacity (C1 and C2): Fleet data from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA, 2004) indicates that
the average airplane of a major airline has 180 coach seats, varying from approximately 50 for a
regional jet to over 400 for a Boeing 747. Given these data, we design two sets of experiments: a
symmetric case with C1 = C2 = 200, and an asymmetric case with C1 = 200 and C2 = 100.

-

Ratio of high fare to low fare ( p H / p L ): In our data set derived from the O&D Survey, the median
fare ratio among all 1500 markets is p H / p L = 2.6. For over 90% of all markets, the ratio fell within
a range from 1.3 to 4. Therefore, we define three scenarios, p H / p L = [1.3, 2.6, 4], for both the
symmetric and asymmetric cases.

-

Proportion of demand due to low-fare passengers: Let  Li (  Hi ) be the average low-fare (high-fare)
demand for airline i, i=1,2. The proportion of low-fare demand is  Li /(  Li   Hi ) . In the data from
the O&D Survey, the median value among all markets is 0.74, with 90% of all markets falling
between 0.5 and 0.9. Therefore, we set  Li /(  Li   Hi ) = [0.5, 0.74, 0.9] for both the symmetric and
asymmetric cases.
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-

Total demand and demand faced by each airline: According to the airline industry trade group the Air
Transport Association (ATA), the industry load factor (the utilization of airplane seats) has hovered
near 70% for the last decade (ATA, 2004). However, there is substantial flight-to-flight variation
around this range, and the application of revenue management techniques generates load factors that
are lower than exogenous demand. Here we assume that total demand is equal to total airline
capacity. In our experiments, this led to realized load factors between 70% and 98%, depending upon
the values of the other parameters.
We must also allocate demand between the airlines. It is most convenient to describe this allocation in
terms of the ‘load’ placed on each airline, where the load for airline i = (  Li   Hi ) / C i . For the
symmetric case, we vary airline 1’s load through three parameters, [0.5, 0.75, 1], which implies that
airline 2’s complementary load is [1.5, 1.25, 1]. For the asymmetric case, airline 1’s load = [0.5, 1,
1.25] and airline 2’s load=[2, 1, 0.5] (recall that in the asymmetric case, airline 1 has 200 seats and
airline 2 has 100).

-

Variability: To limit the number of parameters, we assume that all four customer demand distributions
have the same coefficient of variation, CV. Based on data analyses in Belobaba (1987) and in Jacobs,
Ratliff and Smith (2000), reasonable values for the CV = [0.2, 0.33, 0.6].

-

Correlation: Given the data analysis described in Belobaba (1987) and our own discussions with
managers who work with yield management systems in the airline industry, correlation in the forecast
error among customer classes is usually small. When correlation is significant, positive correlation is
probably more prevalent than negative correlation. Therefore, we assume that correlation   [-0.3,
0.0, 0.3, 0.6]. To limit the number of parameters, we assume that the correlations among all demands
are equal.

-

Probability density: Belobaba (1987) uses industry studies and his own data analysis to show that the
Normal distribution is a reasonable model of demand within each fare class. For each of our
scenarios, we assume that demand is distributed according to a multivariate Normal distribution and is
truncated at zero; any negative demand is added to a mass point at zero.

When combined, these parameters define 2 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 3 * 4  648 scenarios. Solutions were found by a
simple gradient algorithm and the gradients themselves were evaluated by Monte Carlo integration.
For every scenario, we found that the booking limit set by the monopoly, B1a  B2a , was greater
than or equal to the total booking limit under competition, B1c  B2c . The mean difference
( B1a  B2a )  ( B1c  B2c ) across all scenarios is 9.3 seats, and the difference varies from 0 seats to 111 seats.
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In general, the largest differences occur when correlation is low and when both capacity and demand are
balanced among airlines and classes. For a more detailed description of these results, see Netessine and
Shumsky (2004).
If we define the ‘service level’ of a customer class as the probability that all customers of a
particular class are able to purchase a seat on either aircraft (similar to the ‘no-stockout probability’ of
inventory theory), these differences in booking limits can produce significantly different service levels.
Over all 648 scenarios, the service level for low-fare customers rose an average of 5.4 percentage points
under the monopoly (43% to 48%), while the service level for high-fare customers declined an average of
5.3 percentage points under the monopoly (76% to 71%). The range of results was extremely large. The
difference in low-fare service levels was as high as 62%, while the difference in high-fare service levels
reached 30%.
To summarize, in this section we demonstrated that the horizontal game may not be wellbehaved: best responses may exhibit jumps and, quite counter-intuitively, it may be optimal for an airline
to increase its booking limit in response to the increase of booking limit by the competitor. We provided
regularity conditions that ensure existence of a competitive equilibrium and guarantee that the best
response functions are decreasing. Through a combination of analytical results and numerical
experiments, we found that competing airlines tend to reserve too many seats for high-fare passengers. In
the conclusion, Section 8, we will discuss additional managerial insights from this section’s analysis, as
well as from the following analysis of vertical competition.

5. Vertical Competition
Now consider two or more airlines that do not compete horizontally because all of the airlines operate
flights in non-overlapping markets: if airline 1 operates a flight from A to B, then no other airline operates
flights between those cities. However, the airlines do interact because they may exchange connecting
passengers. For example, if airline 2 flies from B to C, then passengers may travel from A to C by flying
on both airline 1 and airline 2. The presence of both local passengers flying one leg (from A to B or from
B to C), and connecting passengers flying both legs leads to important questions of coordination between
the airlines. How many high-fare seats should each airline set aside for connecting passengers? For local
passengers? What happens if the airlines do not collaborate in these decisions?
Our analysis of the DOT’s O&D Survey found many examples of flights by the major airlines
with a high proportion of inter-airline transfer passengers. For example, on flights operated by
Continental between Detroit and Cleveland, we estimate that 65% of passengers transferred to or from
other airlines. Most of these passengers flew on Northwest on the previous leg and transferred from
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Northwest to Continental at Northwest’s hub in Detroit. In addition, the data show that regional airlines
often carry an even higher proportion of passengers who transfer to or from other airlines.
low-fare
passengers

high-fare
passengers

all passengers

Major U.S. Airlines
American
0.18
0.18
0.18
Continental
0.21
0.21
0.21
Delta
0.13
0.17
0.13
Northwest
0.17
0.21
0.18
United
0.17
0.16
0.17
USAirways
0.16
0.19
0.17
Independent regional airlines
Alaska
0.35
0.23
0.34
Hawaiian
0.29
0.05
0.25
Horizon
0.45
0.30
0.44
Mesa
0.84
0.64
0.80
Skyking
0.61
0.40
0.59
Skywest
0.93
0.90
0.92
Regional airlines controlled by major airlines
American Eagle
0.75
0.53
0.69
Comair (Delta)
0.73
0.65
0.71
Delta Connection – Atlanta Southeast
0.84
0.73
0.82
Mesaba/Northwest Airlink
0.84
0.59
0.80
United Express – Atlantic
0.93
0.89
0.92
Table 1: Fraction of U.S. passengers who are connecting to or from another airline
(source: DOT’s O&D Survey)

Table 1 shows the estimated fraction of inter-airline connecting passengers on flights in the U.S.
for many of the largest airlines listed in the DOT’s O&D Survey data from the 4th quarter of 1999 (DOT
2004). To calculate these numbers we first examined each flight leg operated by each airline and found
the number of passengers whose ticket showed either a transfer from a different airline on the previous leg
or a transfer to a different airline on the next leg. The actual numbers in Table 1 were produced by
dividing the number of these inter-airline connecting passengers by the total number of passengers. In
addition, the O&D Survey classifies each ticket as ‘restricted’ or ‘unrestricted’, and we used this
classification as a proxy for our ‘low-fare’ and ‘high-fare’ categories (for more on this classification
scheme, see Section 4.3).
From the Table we see that approximately 15-20% of the passengers on the major airlines are
connecting passengers. Regional airlines controlled by the major airlines such as American Eagle and
Comair (which is a wholly owned subsidiary of Delta) tend to have a high proportion of connections to
and from the controlling partner, around 70% - 90%. For these partners, revenue management decisions
are coordinated so that there is no ‘vertical competition’ between the major airline and the subsidiary. On
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the other hand, consider the independent regional airlines, which also have extremely high proportions of
connecting passengers but do not coordinate pricing and seat allocation decisions with their partners.
These airlines provide us with examples of vertical competition. For example, Skywest feeds passengers
to flights operated by Continental, Delta and United, and over 90% of its passengers are connecting
passengers. Geographically concentrated airlines, such as Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air also saw a
large number of transfers from other airlines, 34% and 44%, respectively. The analysis that led to Table 1
included only flights operated within the U.S. Most international flights operated by the major airlines
also have a high fraction of passengers connecting with other airlines (Fernandez de la Torre, 1999).
In this section we consider the impact of these connecting passengers on yield management
policies. Throughout this Section we assume that none of the airlines compete horizontally, so that each
operates legs in separate markets. Second, we assume that the total revenue generated by any itinerary is
the sum of the revenues that would have been generated by a local passenger on each leg of the route. For
example, suppose airline 1 flies on a route from city A to city B, while airline 2 flies from B to C. Local
passengers traveling from A to B generate revenue pk1 , k  L, H to airline 1 and are worth pk 2 to airline
2. Connecting passengers traveling from A to C are worth pk1  pk 2 , k  L, H .
We must also make assumptions about how the revenue is split between the airlines. In our
model, the airlines’ code sharing agreements allow each airline to book a connecting passenger on any
other airline, and if an airline makes a connecting booking it keeps the local fare and distributes the
remainder to the appropriate partners. Note that the actual ‘local fares’ may be negotiated among the
airlines in advance. For example, they may be based on the length of the two legs, a system called
'mileage proration' (Boyd, 1998a). However, we assume that the revenue contributed by a connecting
passenger to each airline is equal to the revenue that each airline would obtain from a local customer
flying a single leg in the same fare class. This simplifies the problem because connecting and local
demands then fall naturally into the same booking-limit classes (or buckets) on each airline.
Given this partition of capacity, each airline uses a ‘free sale’ mechanism to allocate capacity to
the other airline. Specifically, each airline provides real-time seat availability information to its partner.
If an airline wants to book a low-fare seat on the other airline, it can, as long as the appropriate booking
class is open. This mechanism is sometimes called ‘automated codesharing,’ and it is an increasingly
popular mechanism for allocating capacity among airline alliance partners (Fernandez de la Torre, 1999
and Talluri and van Ryzin, 2004).
First, we wish to determine whether the airlines, each optimizing this objective function over its
own booking limits, reach a competitive equilibrium. In addition, we want to compare the behavior of
these uncoordinated airlines with the behavior of a single, centralized airline that optimizes over the entire
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network. In fact, there are a variety of methods that a central authority may use to allocate seats among
the various types of demand on each flight leg (recall that each leg has low and high-fare local demands
as well as low and high-fare connecting demands along any number of routes). Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004) provide a lucid introduction to this topic. They describe (i) 'partitioned booking limits' so that each
type of demand has its own booking class, (ii) 'virtual nesting controls' in which flights with similar profit
implication are placed in the same virtual class, and (iii) bid-price controls in which each booking request
is evaluated in real-time against the total expected marginal cost of satisfying that request.
We will assume that our centralized airline uses a virtual nesting control system and that local and
all connecting passengers of each fare class continue to co-exist in the same virtual class. In other words,
the centralized airline maintains the same two-class booking limit structure described above; the only
difference is that the airline determines a different, 'optimal' booking limit for each flight leg that may
take into account the larger revenue that connecting customers can provide. For many parameters this is a
reasonable method for allocating capacity. For example, the expected net marginal network profit
generated by a low-fare connecting customer is often closer to the local low-fare revenue than the local
high-fare revenue (although the connecting passenger who travels on more than one leg generates more
revenue, that passenger may displace a local customer on each leg). Such virtual nesting systems are
quite popular in practice because of their simplicity and their conformance with existing airline
reservation systems. Maintaining the same booking-limit structure also allows us to compare directly the
competitive equilibrium and centralized cases.
To gain some intuition about what happens under competition, we will now consider a few
extreme cases. In Section 5.1 we examine a general network topology with any number of airlines
making any number of connections, but we limit the allocation of connecting customers to either the highfare or low-fare categories, but not both.3 We will see that in the first scenario competing airlines set

booking limits that are lower than is centrally optimal and in the second scenario competing airlines set
booking limits that are higher than centrally optimal. In Section 5.2 we construct a model of two airlines
exchanging passengers across two legs, and we examine numerically the impact of having passenger
connections in both fare categories.
5.1.

General networks with connecting customers in either the low-fare or the high-fare bucket

3

One might also consider another special case with both types of connecting demand but no local demand. While this may
appear interesting, it turns out that local demand plays an important stabilizing role in the game and that an analysis of this
special case is uninformative. For example, consider any number of airlines that operate a sequence of legs connecting cities A
to B to C…. It can be shown that when there is no local demand, any solution Bi  B j , i, j such that 0  Bi  min j C j , is
a Nash equilibrium.
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Consider an M-leg network between an arbitrary number of cities. The network may be a series of cities,
A to B to C…, or it may be a more complex network involving multiple airlines feeding passengers to
multiple hubs. Each leg on this network is controlled by one of N airlines, NM. Legs are indexed by
i=1,…,M and airlines are indexed by k=1,…,N. Capacity offered on each leg is Ci. Passengers travel on
individual legs as well as on any combinations of successive legs. Passengers traveling on a single leg i
pay pki , k  L, H and passengers traveling on a route that includes a set  of several legs pay

p
j

kj

,

k  L, H . The airlines’ code-sharing agreement allows each airline to book a connecting passenger on the
other airline, and if an airline controlling legs in  makes a connecting booking in class k, it keeps

p

kj

and pays

j



pkj to the airlines controlling other legs. To describe the total demand faced by

j / 

each airline, we define B as a vector of booking limits on all M legs and B  i as a vector of booking limits
on M-1 legs excluding leg i. Furthermore,

 

 

 

 

DLiT B i  DLi  DLi B  i and
T
DHi
B  DHi  DHi B , where

DLi , DHi = local low-fare and high-fare demand specific to the leg i,

 

 

DLi B i , DHi B = connecting low-fare and high-fare demand on the leg i, given the decisions
made on the other legs.

 

We assume that the connecting demands have the following properties: DLi B i is increasing in

 

Bi , and DHi B is decreasing in B . For the analytical results in this section we will not specify a
functional form for DLi ( B j ) or DHi ( Bi , B j ) , for these first-order assumptions are sufficient. These
assumptions are also quite intuitive: a higher booking limit on any one leg opens more seats for
connecting low-fare passengers for other airlines on the network, while a lower booking limit opens more
seats for connecting high-fare passengers. In Section 5.2 we will describe one specific functional form for
the connecting demands that satisfies these assumptions.
The profit generated for an airline from a particular leg i is,



  



 



  

 i  E  pLi min DLi  DLi B  i , Bi  pHi min DHi  DHi B , Ci  min DLi  DLi B  i , Bi 
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The total profit of airline k controlling a set of legs k is  k 

j k

j

. We will compare the booking

limits resulting from such vertical competition with the booking limits that a monopolistic airline would
set. For a single monopolistic airline set  simply includes all M legs.
We will consider two extreme situations: in the first, all connecting passengers will fly in the low
fare only and in the second all connecting passengers will fly in the high fare only. Before we do so, we
will prove one theorem that will be instrumental later on.
Proposition 4. Consider an N-players non-cooperative game with each player k=1,…,N endowed with a

 

vector of strategies B k   Bk1 , Bk 2 ,..., Bki ,... and a payoff  k B . Let B denote equilibria of this game
c

 

a

and let B denote the “alliance” solutions. Then, if each  k B is supermodular in B and moreover, if
c

a

c

a

 k / B ji  0, j  k , i (correspondingly,  k / B ji  0, j  k , i ) then B  B ( B  B ).
Proof: Consider a fictitious game in which every player is still endowed with a vector of strategies

B k   Bk1 , Bk 2 ,..., Bki ,... but the payoff now is





 

 

 k B,    k B     m B , k .
mk

(5.1)

c

Note that for   0 the equilibrium of this game is B and for   1 the equilibrium of this game is B

a

because each player optimizes the sum of all players’ payoffs. Hence, in order to compare the
competitive solution with the alliance solution it suffices to show that the equilibrium of the game defined





by (5.1) is monotone in  . To show that this is the case, observe that  k B,  is supermodular in B as
a sum of supermodular functions. Further,



 k B, 






 2  k B, 
B ji

   B , k ,

mk





mk

m

  , k , j, i.

 m B
B ji





Hence, if  k / B ji  0, j  k , i , we have that  2  k B,  / B ji  0 so that the game is
supermodular in all players’ strategies as well as in the parameter  . From Topkis (1998), it follows that
c

a

the set of equilibria of this game is monotonically increasing in  and hence B  B . The second part is
shown analogously. 
c

a

At this point, it is worthwhile pointing out that B  B in a set-ordering sense. That is, the largest and
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the smallest equilibria satisfy this inequality but not necessarily every solution does. Topkis (1998, pg.
c

a

32) calls this the ‘induced set ordering.’ Of course, if the equilibria are unique then B  B in the
conventional way.
We now return to the airline problem. First, consider the problem with connecting passengers in
the low fare only. In this case revenues on a given leg are

 





  

   



 i B  E  pLi min DLi  DLi B i , Bi  pHi min DHi , Ci  min DLi  DLi B i , Bi  .


Proposition 5. Suppose the distribution of  DLi , DHi  is TP2 and all connecting passengers are in the low
c

a

fare. Then B  B .

 

Proof: Note first that all  i B are clearly increasing in B  i because an increase in B  i makes more

connecting low-fare demand available for the leg i without affecting high-fare demand. Further, the first
derivative is
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Under the TP2 assumption,  i / Bi is increasing in B  i so that every  i B is supermodular, and so is

 

c

a

 k B . Hence, conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied and B  B . 
We now turn to the case with all connecting passengers in the high fare. Recall that, generally

 

speaking, DHi B is a function of Bi as well as B  i . The dependence on Bi is due to the fact that Bi
affects demand for low-fare connecting passengers on legs other than i which, in its turn, affects the

 

number of connecting high fare passengers that can be accommodated which affects DHi B . However,

 

if connecting passengers are only in the high fare, the dependence of DHi B on Bi disappears and we

 

can write DHi B i . Revenues on a given leg are



 



 i  E  pLi min  DLi , Bi   pHi min DHi  DHi B i , Ci  min  DLi , Bi  


c

a

Proposition 6. Suppose that all connecting passengers are in the high fare. Then B  B .

 

Proof: Note first that all  i B are decreasing in B  i because an increase in B  i makes less connecting
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high-fare demand available for the leg i without affecting low-fare demand. Further, the first derivative is



 

so that every   B  is supermodular, and so is   B  . Hence,

 i
 pLi Pr  DLi  Bi   pHi Pr DHi  DHi B  i  Ci  Bi , DLi  Bi .
Bi

Therefore,  i / Bi is increasing in B  i

i

c

k

a

conditions of Proposition 4 are satisfied and B  B . 
The results of Propositions 5 and 6 are intuitive: competing airlines undervalue connecting
customers because each airline only receives a fraction of the total revenue from those customers. When
connecting traffic travels only in the low-fare bucket, competing airlines establish lower booking limits
and sell fewer connecting tickets than is optimal for the network. The opposite happens when connecting
passengers travel only in the high-fare bucket. These results also suggest that when connecting
passengers are allocated to both buckets, the comparison of booking limits under competition and
centralization may depend upon the proportion of connecting passengers in the two buckets, the
conjecture that we verify in the next section.
5.2.

Connecting passengers in both buckets.

In order to verify our conjecture in the previous section, we focus on a simpler network, with just two
airlines (airline 1 and airline 2) operating two legs (legs 1 and 2, respectively). We also assign a
particular functional form to DLi ( B j ) and DHi ( Bi , B j ) . When considering how these demands are
generated, the following issue arises: if both local and connecting passengers are accommodated in a
bucket, how many seats are sold to local passengers and how many to connecting passengers? For this
example, assume that both local and connecting passengers arrive uniformly over the reservation period.
First consider low-fare connecting passengers. If the booking limit of airline j is not a constraint, then
airline j can book all available connecting passengers, and these passengers are available for airline i:
DLi ( B j )  DL . However, if the booking limit of airline j is a constraint, the number of local and
connecting tickets sold is proportional to their realized demands: DLi ( B j )   DL /( DL  DLj )  B2 . Similar
reasoning applies for high-fare demand. Therefore,



Bj
DLi ( B j )  min 
,1 DL ,
 DL  DLj 
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(5.2)





 C  min B , D  D ( B ) 
i
j
Lj
Lj
i
DHi ( Bi , B j )  min 
,1 DH .


DHj  DH



(5.3)

As required, DLi ( B j ) is increasing in B j and DHi ( Bi , B j ) is decreasing in Bi and Bj. Again, definitions
(5.2) and (5.3) are useful examples and will be used in numerical experiments later in this section, but
they are not necessary for the analytical results in Section 5.1.
Airline i’s objective function is,











 i  E  pLi min DLi  DLi  B j  , Bi  pHi min DHi  DHi  Bi , B j  , Ci  min DLi  DLi  B j  , Bi 


In Table 1, we saw that airlines must often make yield management decisions with a significant
number of inter-airline connections in all fare classes. To examine this general case, we conducted
numerical experiments to find the difference between the competitive equilibrium booking limits, Bic , and
the system-optimal booking limits, Bia for a variety of problem parameters. Here we will present the
results of one set of experiments with two identical airlines, each with 200 seats and each facing a total
expected demand of 200 passengers, including both local and connecting passengers in both fare classes.
(After the application of yield management controls, this produces load factors between 85% and 95% in
the following set of experiment.) We also performed an additional set of experiments with asymmetric
airlines: one regional airline with a 100-seat plane ‘feeding’ a major airline with a 200-seat plane. The
results of those experiments were similar to the results shown here and hence are not reported.
We again used the O&D Survey and other sources of data to determine the parameters for the
experiments. Based on the analysis described in Section 4.3, we set pH / pL to the baseline value of 2.6.
All demands were distributed as independent normal random variables, truncated at 0, with coefficients of
variation equal to 0.33 (Belobaba, 1987). Given the results from the O&D Survey, we allocated 74% of
local demand to low-fare passengers. To determine the proportion of high-fare and low-fare connecting
traffic, we again examined each of the markets in the O&D survey. We found that among inter-airline
connecting passengers, the fraction of high-fare tickets varied from 0 to 0.9. Therefore, we varied the
fraction E ( DH ) / E ( DL  DH ) across this range. Finally, let f c represent the fraction of demand due to
passengers connecting from other airlines, a number that is roughly equivalent to the statistic shown in the
third column of Table 1. We set f c =[0.25, 0.75], a range that includes most of the markets in the O&D
Survey with a significant number of connecting travelers.
In all experiments, we assumed that connecting demands were generated according to the
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uniformity assumption that led to equations (5.2) and (5.3). We used Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate
the objective function when finding the optimal booking limits for each airline, and variability in the
generated demand accounts for the random variation in the trend line. Figure 4 shows the results of the
experiments.

competitive equil. booking limit
- centralized booking limit,
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12
10

fc = 0.75
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2
0
-2
0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

fraction of connecting demand in high-fare bin,
E ( DH ) / E ( DL  DH )

Figure 4: Comparing competitive and centralized booking limits

The left-hand side of the figure, with E ( DH ) / E ( DL  DH )  0 , is equivalent to the scenario with
all connecting passengers in the low-fare bucket (Section 5.1), and we see that equilibrium booking limits
are slightly lower under competition which is consistent with our results. When
E ( DH ) / E ( DL  DH )  0.9 , most connecting passengers are in the high-fare bucket and, as we found in
Section 5.1, the booking limits are higher under competition. The intermediate cases show a gradual
transition between the two extremes, and at one point the competing airlines establish the centrally
optimal booking limits. However, in the majority of examples we examined, the impact of connecting
passengers in the high-fare bucket dominated, so that booking limits tend to be higher under competition.
From Figure 4 we see that having proportionally more connecting demand (higher f c ) tends to increase
the difference between the competitive and centralized booking limits.
In this set of experiments, the difference in network profits between the ‘optimal’ solution and the
competitive equilibrium varied from 0, where the solutions are equal, to 0.6% when 75% of all demand is
connecting demand, and most of that connecting demand is in the high-fare bin. Higher profit differences
were seen with even higher levels of connecting demand and stronger negative correlations among
demands. For comparison, Talluri and Van Ryzin (2002) mention that optimal network controls can lead
to "improvements on the order of 0.5% …with gains

can be as high as 2% or more under high load
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factors." Note, however, that we are not comparing the competitive equilibrium with the truly optimal
control scheme; our ‘centralized’ solution is the optimal booking limit, given the sub-optimal virtual
nesting scheme that places local and connecting demands in the same fare class.

6. Revenue-sharing Agreements
We have shown that both vertical and horizontal competition on airline routes can lead to a sub-optimal
allocation of seats among fare classes. Here we examine how contractual arrangements can coordinate
the actions of the two airlines. This is a timely subject, given the proliferation of airline alliances that are
presumably trying to do just that. Other work on this subject includes Wynne (1995), who bases transfer
prices between airlines on the value of local fares charged in each market traveled by the connecting
passengers, Boyd (1998b) who finds prices from the marginal value of each seat on each airline, and Feng
and Gallego (2003), who examine contracts in which a firm pays a fixed fare to an airline, while the
airline agrees to accept bookings as long as seats are available. In practice, the airline industry has been
struggling to develop effective coordination schemes for its various alliances (Fernandez de la Torre,
1999).
There has been a wealth of research on contracting in the area of supply chain management (see
Cachon, 2004, for an overview). Most of these contracts combine a wholesale price with another lever,
such as buyback agreements, revenue-sharing agreements, or options. In our setting there is no equivalent
of the ‘wholesale price’ between a supplier and a retailer, and therefore we will specify a different type of
contract based on transfer prices. However, the method used to derive our contract is similar to methods
used to determine many supply chain contracts: we reformulate each player’s objective function so that it
becomes a linear transformation of the centralized objective function. This is similar in spirit to the “costbased revenue sharing” described by Fernandez de la Torre (1999), who notes that such schemes “[raise]
the difficult question of how to allocate revenue generated by connecting traffic to the leg that is
codeshared .” (pg. 155) That is the problem we address here. Note that this technique is appropriate not
only when airlines compete on booking limits, but also when they compete on prices. Here we will derive
a suitable contract for airlines under vertical competition (i.e., airlines in a code-sharing alliance). Similar
techniques identify contracts that coordinate two airlines under horizontal competition.
Each airline’s objective function is





T
 i  E  pLi min  DLiT , Bi   pHi min DHi
, Ci  min  DLiT , Bi   .



where each demand is a function of prices as well as booking limits. During a negotiation phase, the

airlines agree to split profits in proportions a and 1-a. One type of contract found in the supply-chain
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literature would simply allocate total revenues to the two airlines according to proportions a and 1-a.
However, such contracts ask the airlines to share revenues from both connecting and local traffic, and this
may be impossible for technological, competitive, and/or regulatory reasons.
Instead we will assume that the terms of the contract are similar to the scheme proposed by Boyd
(1998b) and described in Talluri and van Ryzin (2004, Section 6.2): when an airline sells a connecting
ticket, it pays a transfer price to the other airline for the seat. However, our method for finding the
transfer payment is different from the duality-based method proposed by Boyd. Here we will demonstrate
this technique for sales in the low-fare class; the derivation for the high-fare commission is similar. When
airline i sells a connecting ticket, it collects revenue pL1  pL 2 and pays airline j a transfer price  j . The
method for calculating the transfer price  j is negotiated in advance, and cannot be changed once
payments begin. As in the previous section, a local low-fare passenger on airline i is worth pLi in
revenue.
In our formulation the transfer price will depend upon the expected flow of traffic, specifically, the
expected number of connecting passengers and total passengers, given each airline’s booking limit. Let T
be the number of connecting tickets sold in the low-fare class and let Ti be the number of connecting

 

 

tickets sold by airline i (so that T1  T2  T ). Given this notation, airline 1 earns pL1 min DLT1 , B1  T

from local passengers,  pL1  pL 2   2  T1 from connecting tickets sold by airline 1 and 1 (T  T1 ) from
connecting tickets sold by the partner. To find the coordinating contract, we choose 1 and  2 so that the
expected total revenue from low-fare customers for airline 1 is equal to proportion a of the centralized
revenue from low-fare customers:

 
 
 E  a  p min  D , B   p
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(5.4)

Now let  i be the ratio of the expected number of connecting passengers and the expected number





of passengers accommodated by airline i:  i  E[T ] / E  min DLiT , Bi  . Also let  be the ratio of the
expected number of connecting tickets sold by airline 1 and the total number of connecting tickets sold:

  E[T1 ] / E T  . Dividing (5.4) throughout by E  min  DLT1 , B1   ,

 
pL1 1  1    pL1  pL 2   2  1  1  1  1   a  pL1  pL 2 1  .
2 
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Rearranging terms and dividing through by 1 ,

1   1  pL1     2  pL 2   a

pL 2

2

 1  a 

pL1

1

.

(5.5)

Equation (5.5) shows how the transfer prices depend upon the traffic flows. Given a value of  2  pL 2 ,
(5.5) indicates that the transfer price 1 (i) increases as  increases (ii) increases as 1 increases and (iii)
decreases as  2 increases. Point (i) is intuitive: as airline 1 sells a larger proportion of connecting traffic,
it receives fewer transfer payments from airline 2, and a larger transfer price is needed to align its
behavior. Points (ii) and (iii) are more subtle. For point (ii), a rise in 1 indicates that connecting tickets
represent a higher proportion of airline 1’s sales. This implies that airline 1 is paying airline 2 a transfer
price on a higher proportion of its own ticket sales because of a decrease in airline 1’s local demand.
Because airline 1 acts in its own self-interest, a fall in local demand would push airline 1 to lower its
booking limit at the expense of connecting traffic on airline 2. Therefore, the incentive for airline 1 to
preserve room for connecting traffic must rise, and 1 rises as 1 rises. The reason for point (iii) is
similar.

7. Observations and Future Research
In this paper we have examined how booking-limit decisions are affected by both horizontal competition
(with passenger overflow) and vertical competition (with connecting passengers). We have shown that a
simple condition on the demand distribution, total positivity of order 2, is sufficient to ensure a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium under horizontal competition and under vertical competition when connecting
demand is restricted to the high or low-fare classes. In general, we find that the equilibrium behavior of
competing airlines can be very different from the behavior of competitors in a ‘newsvendor game.’ In this
simpler game, each competitor’s objective function is concave and the game is submodular. However, in
our setting neither property holds, and this leads to best-response functions that can be discontinuous, and
can be either decreasing or increasing. The reason for this disparity is that in the newsvendor game the
decision is how much inventory/capacity to procure while in our model the decision is to allocate fixed
capacity among two customer classes. The problem of allocating fixed capacity is not always wellbehaved even in the absence of competition, i.e. the objective function may not be unimodal, resulting in
the possible lack of competitive equilibrium when competition is introduced. Our model demonstrates
that computerized revenue management systems may generate capacity controls that exhibit non-intuitive
behavior, e.g., may suggest a significant increase in a booking limit without any significant change in
demand, although such behavior is unlikely. An understanding of the underlying causes of these effects
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can be useful for managers.
We have also found that booking limits are lower under horizontal competition than the booking
limits found by a central profit-maximizer. Competitive equilibrium booking limits may be higher, or
lower, under vertical competition, although in a 2-airline, 2-leg case we found that they tend to be higher.
The differences in booking limits can lead to significant differences in the level of service among
customer classes. These results can be useful for managers who are planning expansion into new markets
or facing an entry by a rival. Although airlines lose revenue because of competition, our results indicate
that some groups of customers (high-fare customers under horizontal competition and low-fare customers
under vertical competition) gain because their service is higher under competition than under a monopoly.
The net value to consumer welfare of these losses and gains are, however, not clear, for it depends upon
the comparative value those customers place on the ability to obtain tickets in their chosen fare classes.
We have demonstrated analytically and evaluated numerically both the direction and magnitude of
revenue losses for the two airlines due to competition. Effective coordinating contracts can reduce these
losses, and while there has been much research activity in the area of supply chain contracting, the same
has not occurred in the yield management area. Here we have described a set of revenue-sharing
contracts to coordinate the booking-limit decisions of two airlines with connecting passengers. Our work
is an initial attempt in this direction. Given the proliferation of airline alliances and prevalence of
competition on airline routes, additional efforts are needed.
Our models of full competition included only two airlines with two passenger classes each. In
practice, multiple airlines can be in competition and typically more than two fair classes are offered by
each. Relaxing each of these assumptions presents certain challenges. For example, a model with more
than two airlines competing horizontally is hard to analyze because one has to specify the order in which
passengers overflow when one airline runs out of seats (e.g., from airline 1 to airline 2 and then to airline
3 or first to airline 3 and then airline 2). Consideration of more than two passenger classes complicates
the analysis as well because the number of decision variables (booking limits) and hence the number of
optimality conditions would grow accordingly. Because direct analysis is difficult, simulation has been
used to examine the impact of competition (Belobaba and Wilson, 1997). On the other hand, in Section
5.1 we saw that the analysis of vertical competition on multiple legs among multiple airlines does not
pose significant difficulties, as long as connecting passengers belong to only one fare class. However,
when there are multiple fare classes for connecting passengers, the simple supermodular structure of the
game is not preserved. In this case, the impact of competition depends upon the proportion of customers
in each class. Williamson (1992) and Fernandez de la Torre (1999, pg. 185) use simulation to examine
the impact of various optimization techniques and coordination mechanisms in airline networks with a
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larger number of fare classes.
Another significant concern with the analysis is that when comparing competitive and cooperative
booking limits we assume that both prices and exogenous demand are constant. For some comparisons
this assumption is reasonable. Under horizontal competition, two competing airlines often charge the
same prices throughout the day for travel on a particular route, and some hours in the day are 'competitive'
while others are monopolized by a single airline. Prices are uniform over all flights, but the timing of
flights throughout the day affects the yield management decisions of both airlines. Likewise, in a vertical
alliance, prices may be negotiated far in advance, while the yield management decisions happen in realtime, according to rules that may be quite similar to those described here.
Finally, in practice airlines may be competing on the same leg (horizontally) in addition to competing
on different legs (vertically), and many alliances involve both horizontal and vertical coordination. In our
data analysis we did identify examples of horizontal competition with relatively little vertical competition
(e.g., shuttle flights between Boston and New York) and vertical competition without significant
horizontal competition (e.g., a regional airlines with a monopoly in a small market that is feeding the hub
of a major airline). However, the analysis of simultaneous horizontal and vertical competition is an
interesting area for additional research.

Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2
To prove existence, we will employ Tarsky’s fixed point theorem which states that sufficient conditions
for the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium are that the strategy space is closed and bounded and that
the best-response functions are non-decreasing (Vives, 2000). Note that Tarsky’s theorem does not
require that the best responses are continuous: discontinuities (or ‘jumps’) are allowed, but only jumps up.
Evidently, the strategy space  0, Ci    0, Ci  is closed and bounded. Instead of showing that best
responses are non-decreasing, we will show that the best-response functions are non-increasing because
after a simple re-definition, B   B j , Tarsky’s result applies to this new game (Vives, 2000, page 33,
Remark 13). Consequently, jumps down in the best-response functions are allowed, but not jumps up.
We will first use the Implicit Function Theorem (IFT) to show that best responses are decreasing
whenever they are differentiable (Part I). This, however, does not eliminate the existence of jumps up
because the IFT can only characterize the best response at points where it is differentiable. In Part II we
will demonstrate that the best-response functions can only have jumps down.
Part I. By the IFT,
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 2

Bi B j
B j

 2
Bi2

(5.6)

At player i’s best response,  2 i Bi2  0 and we will show that  2 i Bi B j  0 whenever the firstorder conditions hold. Equivalently, we want to show that the first derivative (4.2) is decreasing in Bj.
T
First note that, given a particular realization D   DLi , DLj , DHi , DHj  , DLiT is decreasing in Bj and DHi
is

increasing in Bj. The first two probability terms can be rewritten as,
T
pLi Pr( DLiT  Bi )  pHi Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bi , DLiT  Bi )
T
 Pr( DLiT  Bi )  pLi  pHi Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bi | DLi  Bi  ( DLj  B j )  )  .

(5.7)

Because DLiT is decreasing in Bj, the first probability term Pr  DLiT  Bi  is decreasing in Bj. From
T
Theorem 2.3 of Joe (1997), TP2 implies that DLi and DHi
are right-tail increasing, i.e.,
T
Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bi | DLi  Bi  ( DLj  B j )  ) is increasing in Bj. Finally, since the first-order conditions hold

at the equilibrium, we are assured that the expression in square brackets is positive and therefore (5.7) is
decreasing in Bj.
Now we show that the last probability term in (4.2) is increasing in Bj and, because this term is
multiplied by ‘  pH ’, the derivative must be decreasing in Bj. The final term can be rewritten,
T
Pr( DLi  Bi , DLjT  B j , DHj  R j , DHi
 Ci  Bi )

 Pr( DLi  Bi , DLi  DLj  Bi  B j , DLi  DLj  DHj  C j  Bi , DLi  DLj  DHi  DHj  Ci  C j )
The booking limit Bj only appears once in this expression, in the event ‘ DLi  DLi  Bi  B j ’, and
the probability of this event increases as Bj increases. Therefore, the last probability term
increases,  2 1 B1B2  0 , and best responses are decreasing whenever they are differentiable.
Corollary to Part I (will be used in Part II): Suppose Bi* ( B*j ) is some point on player’s i best response

function. Then  2 i Bi B j  0 holds for any  Bi , B j    0, Bi*   0, B*j  .
Proof: We only need to show that
T
pLi  pHi Pr( DHi
 Ci  Bi | DLi  Bi  ( DLj  B j )  )

(5.8)

everywhere on  Bi , B j    0, Bi*   0, B*j  , and then the reasoning of Part I applies to show that
 i Bi is decreasing in B j over the appropriate range. We demonstrated that (5.8) is true at Bi* ( B*j ) .
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We know that the probability term on the right is increasing in Bj if TP2 holds so the result holds for any
B j  B*j . Similarly, we can show that this term is increasing in Bi if TP2 holds. Expand this term as,









Pr  Bi  DHi  DHj  C j  min DLj   DLi  Bi  , B j





 Ci DLi  Bi   DLj  B j  


There are three Bi in this expression. An increase in the first or third values of Bi clearly leads to an
increase in the probability expression, but the impact of the second Bi is the opposite. However, the first
Bi dominates the second; the expression





Bi  DHi  DHj  C j  min DLj   DLi  Bi  , B j






is increasing in Bi. Therefore, if the inequality (5.8) holds at Bi* ( B*j ) , it will also hold at any Bi  Bi* and
B j  B*j .

Part II: We now eliminate the possibility of jumps up in the best responses. Jumps occur when the

objective function is bi-modal (or multi-modal). We will only consider the bi-modal case (the multimodal case is analogous). The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there is a jump up in the best
response Bi ( B j ) that occurs at B*j (see Figure 5). There are two global maxima Bi1  B*j   Bi2  B*j  ,

 i  Bi1 , B*j    i  Bi2 , B*j  , and the first-order necessary condition holds at each of them. Because there is a
jump up,  i  Bi1 , B*j      i  Bi2 , B*j    . That is, as we increase B*j infinitesimally, the second
maximum becomes the unique global maximum. This implies,
d  i dB j

 B ,B 
1
i

*
j

 d  i dB j

B

2 *
i ,B j



,

because the objective function of player i rises faster (or declines more slowly) at the second local
maximum Bi2 than at the first local maximum Bi1 . Using the envelope theorem,
 i B j

 B ,B 
1
i

*
j

  i B j

B

2 *
i ,B j



.

(5.9)

A necessary condition for (5.9) is that  2 i / Bi B j  0 somewhere between the two best response points
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Figure 5: A Jump Up

 

 

Bi1 B*j and Bi2 B*j . However, from the Corollary to Part I we know that  2 i / xi x j  0 for every

 B , B   0, B  B   0, B  , and this is sufficient to show a contradiction.
i

j

2
i

*
j

*
j

Therefore, a jump up is

impossible, and the best-response function is decreasing.
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